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To Weed or Not to Weed? The Colorado
Quandary of Legitimate Marijuana
Businesses and the Financial Institutions
Who Are Unable to Serve Them
Rachel Cheasty Sanders*
ABSTRACT

In 2012, Colorado voters passed Amendment 64, legalizing recreational marijuana. Marijuana, however, remains an illegal controlled substance under federal law. As a result of federal anti-money laundering
laws, financial institutions risk prosecution if they provide services to
customers whose funds derive from illegal activities. The Obama Administration issued guidance to help both law enforcement and financial
institutions navigate this murky area. This guidance directed U.S. Attorneys to focus their resources on prosecuting persons whose activities implicate any federal priority designated by the Department of Justice. If
state-legal marijuana businesses adhere to state law and financial institutions follow proper protocol, there should be little chance of prosecution.
However, the guidance provides no guarantees, and most financial institutions refuse to take the risk.
*J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, 2016. I would like to thank Kelsie Massini and Jose Figueroa, Jr. for being my
sounding boards. I would also like to thank Prof. Adam Muchmore for saving my comment -and my sanity- when I thought all was lost. And a special thank you to my husband Patrick for his incredible support throughout this process.
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The lack of available banking services forces marijuana businesses
to function as cash-only operations. This not only leads to tax, payroll,
and vendor problems, but also makes the operation a target for crime. To
tackle this problem, Colorado passed legislation to create cannabis cooperatives, which would allow marijuana businesses to pool their resources
and offer bank accounts and credit to members. For the state to implement these cooperatives, according to the legislation, the Federal Reserve
must approve the plan.
This Comment examines the federal banking laws that inhibit financial institutions from offering services to state-legal marijuana businesses
and the Obama Administration's guidance. This Comment will also consider the obstacles marijuana businesses face due to the lack of banking
services and the problems with relying on administrative guidance. This
Comment posits that, in the absence of congressional action, Colorado
can provide a short-term solution by implementing cooperatives, without
approval from the Federal Reserve, under the authority of its traditional
police powers.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the federal Controlled Substances Act' ("CSA") criminalizing marijuana possession and distribution, a majority of states have legalized marijuana use for medicinal purposes, and four states along with the
District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational use. 2 In
November 2012, voters in Colorado and Washington voted to legalize
recreational marijuana.3 In November 2014, citizens of Oregon, Alaska,
and the District of Columbia also cast votes to permit recreational marijuana.4 All three of the initiatives passed, sparking discussions that other
states, such as California, Arizona, Nevada, Massachusetts, and Maine,
will place similar initiatives on their ballots in 2016.' But how can a
state legalize an activity that the federal government has deemed unlawful? Presumably, it cannot. Yet, that is exactly what these states did.
The focus of this Comment, however, will not revolve around the legalization of marijuana, but rather the federal laws that inhibit the nation's
financial sector from serving these state-legal businesses.
After Colorado legalized recreational marijuana, the Obama Administration issued administrative guidance directing U.S. Attorneys to conserve their resources by prosecuting only those marijuana businesses and
financial institutions whose activities implicated important federal interests. 6 These guidance documents, however, failed to create any legal
1. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2014).
2. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., tbl.1 (Nov. 13,
2014), http://bit.ly/1MQp6Z7 (indicating which states have comprehensive medical marijuana programs, legal marijuana retailers, and limited medical marijuana access).
3. See Philip A. Wallach & John Hudak, Legal Marijuana: Comparing Washington
and Colorado, BRooKiNGs INST. (July 8, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://brook.gs/lOuzfuX.
4. See Dan Merica, Oregon, Alaska, and Washington, D.C. Legalize Marijuana,
CNN (Nov. 5, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://cnn.it/lOsOgdL; See also Matt Ferner & Arthur
Delaney, D.C. Marijuana Law Blocked By Congress, But There May Be A Loophole,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2014, 11:29 PM), http://huff.to/139m9lG (reporting that
Congress's spending bill "prohibits both federal and local funds from being used to implement a referendum legalizing recreational marijuana use in the District").
5. See Merica, supra note 4.
6. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to All United
States Attorneys (Feb. 14, 2014), http://l.usa.gov/lkLGqn6 [hereinafter Feb. Cole
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protections in the event that U.S. Attorneys decide to prosecute.7 Instead
of treating these documents as a "green-light" to bank with the state-legal

marijuana industry, financial institutions continue to refuse to offer services to these businesses. 8

Without banking services, state-legal marijuana businesses must
operate on a cash-only basis.9 Thus, marijuana businesses become targets for robberies due to the large amount of cash they keep on hand.' 0

Additionally, some third parties who engage in business with marijuana
establishments cannot secure banking services as a result of their connec-

tion to the industry."

Other issues arise in conjunction with reporting

and paying local,
state, and federal taxes, as well as paying employees
2
vendors.'
and
Although many believe that congressional action is the best solution
to this dilemma,' 3 Congress thus far has failed to act. Nevertheless, a soMemo]; U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FIN-2014G001: BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses, (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://1.usa.gov/1U1 ldIK [hereinafter FinCEN Guidance]; Memorandum from James M.
Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to All United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://l.usa.gov/lATIble [hereinafter Aug. Cole Memo]. See discussion infra Parts
II.B.5.a, II.B.5.b, II.B.5.c.
7. See Feb. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 3; Aug. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 4.
8. See John B. Stephens, Pot Shops Shunned by Banks Haul in the Cash, USA TODAY, Aug. 31, 2014, http://usat.ly/ 17jJpif (quoting Jennifer Waller, senior vice president
of Colorado Bankers Association, stating "[the] media was saying it was a green light.
We said, 'No, it continues to be a very solid red light; not even yellow, to be honest"');
Pete Williams & Herb Weisbaum, US Government Issues Rules for Banks on Dealing
with Legal Marijuana Vendors, NBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2014, 2:00 PM),
http://cnb.cx/lhjdQcf (quoting Amanda Averch, director of communications at the Colorado Bankers Association, stating "[w]e don't see that guidance as giving banks a full
green light to bank these businesses").
9. See David Migoya, State Banks Pot Money That Industry is Unable to do Itself,
DENVER POST, Jan. 5, 2014, http://dpo.st/1VHpgrF; Jacob Sullum, Mariuana Money is
Still a Pot of Trouble for Banks, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2014, 5:42 PM),
http://onforb.es/lDnUWZZ [hereinafter "Sullum, MarijuanaMoney"].
10. See Trevor Hughes, Pots of MariuanaCash Cause Security Concerns, USA TODAY, July 13, 2014, http://usat.ly/1 n2aXi6.
11. See id.
12. See Marcie Geffiier, Banks Just Say No to MaryuanaBusinesses, Fox BUSINESS
(July 24, 2014), http://fxn.ws/I fxpBMo; Matt Femer, House Votes to Allow Banking Access for Marijuana Businesses, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2014, 5:15 PM),
http://huff.to/1I31Wv5 [hereinafter "Femer, House Votes"]; Sullum, Maryuana Money,
supra note 9.
13. See S. Res. 14-003, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Colo. 2014) (adopted
May 5, 2014) [hereinafter "Colo. S. Res. 14-003"] ("[Tihe best solution to the problem... will be comprehensive federal legislation .. "); Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming)(manuscript at 44),
http://bit.ly/lOuzExu ("Department of Justice and FinCEN guidance failed to adequately
address marijuana banking.... Congress must act."); Danielle Douglas, Banks Are Slowly Welcoming Legal Marijuana Dealers, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 12, 2014,
http://wapo.st/lp59Spt [hereinafter "Douglas, Banks Slowly Welcoming"] ("'[W]e need
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lution may exist in the executive branch because the Attorney General
14
has the authority under the CSA to reclassify controlled substances.
President Obama, however, has stated that he feels this action should be
undertaken by the legislature regardless of the express authority vested in
the Attorney General by the CSA.1'
The issue for analysis, therefore, becomes what power Colorado has
to solve the marijuana banking problem in the interim until Congress or
the President chooses to act. Instead of sitting idly, Colorado passed the
Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act 16 ("Cooperatives Act"),
which would form cannabis cooperatives, member-owned organizations
that would offer banking services to state-legal marijuana businesses that
meet certain conditions prescribed by the law. 17 Although the law calls
for approval from the Federal Reserve System before implementation,
this Comment argues that Colorado, under its traditional police powers
discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2006 decision Gonzales v.
Oregon,18 should implement its cannabis cooperatives plan regardless of
federal approval.
This Comment will analyze the Gonzales decision alongside the
Cooperatives Act to demonstrate that Colorado has the authority under
its traditional police powers to implement the Act without Federal Reserve approval. Part II of this Comment outlines the laws governing marijuana and the financial industry, including the United States Constitution, Colorado state laws, federal drug and banking laws, and
administrative guidance issued by federal agencies. Part III analyzes the
problems arising from cash-only marijuana businesses, the efforts in
Colorado to provide financial services to these businesses, and the solution to utilize its traditional police powers. In conclusion, Part IV summarizes the issues raised in this Comment.

Congress' to intervene."); Stephens, supra note 8 ("Financial institutions aren't going to
wade into the marijuana business until they're confident they won't face legal action....
They point to legislation.").
14. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2014) ("[T]he Attorney
General may by rule- (1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any
drug or other substance... (2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules.").
15. See Jacob Sullum, Obama, Who Evidently Has Not Read The Controlled Substances Act, Denies That He Has the Power to Reclassify Mariuana, FORBES (Jan. 31,
2014, 1:22 PM), http://onforb.es/LxGOGT (reporting a CNN interview where President
Obama stated "what is and isn't a Schedule I narcotic is a job for Congress").
16. Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act, H.B. 1398, 69th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014) (enacted June 6, 2014 as COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-33-101 to -128
(2014)) [hereinafter cited as COLO. REV. STAT.].
17. See id.
18. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Amendment 64: ColoradoLegalizes RecreationalMarijuana

In 2012, Colorado citizens voted to pass Amendment 64, an
amendment to the state constitution legalizing the use and sale of marijuana for recreational purposes.1 9 On January 1, 2014, consumers formed
lines outside of cannabis retail stores and participated in the nation's first
day of legal recreational marijuana sales.2 0 On this day, cannabis retail
shops sold approximately $1 million worth of marijuana products.2'
Amendment 64 permits persons 21 years of age and older to purchase one ounce or less of marijuana daily22 and allows individuals to
grow no more than six marijuana plants for strictly personal use. 23 Additionally, Amendment 64 allows individuals to gift one ounce or less to
another person, provided the recipient is 21 years of age or older. 24 Furthermore, Amendment 64 requires all marijuana consumption to take
place in private. 5
Although Amendment 64 legalizes recreational marijuana, the sale
or transfer as a gift to a minor is strictly prohibited, as are the possession
and use of marijuana by minors.26 Moreover, Amendment 64 prohibits
operating a vehicle while under the influence of the drug.27 Additionally,
employers are not restricted from banning marijuana use in the workplace, nor from implementing policies banning employees from using
marijuana elsewhere.2 8
Furthermore, because Amendment 64 is a constitutional amendment, legal recreational marijuana can only be eliminated by a further
amendment to the state's constitution. Conversely, in states where mari19. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2012) (incorporating Amendment 64: Use and
Regulation of Marijuana which was proposed May 20, 2011 and enacted Nov. 6, 2012).
See also Amendment 64-Legalize MarjuanaElection Results, DENVER POST, Nov. 8,
2012, http://dpo.st/lyGvPOP (reporting Amendment 64 passed with 54.8% of voters).
20. See John Ingold, World's first legal recreationalmarijuanasales begin in Colorado, DENVER POST, Jan. 1, 2014, http://dpo.st/Kje3xy.
21. See Andrea Rael, Colorado MarjuanaSales Surpass $1 Million on First Day,
HUFFfNGTON POST, (Jan. 23, 2014, 2:44 PM), http://huff.to/19GgwNY.
22. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a).
23. Id.§ 16(3)(b) (restricting the number of mature, flowering plants to three at one
time).
24. Id.§ 16(3)(c).
25. Id.§ 16(3)(d).
26. Id.§ 16(6)(c).
27. COLo. CONST. art.XVIII. § 16(6)(b).
28. Id. § 16(6)(a) ("Nothing in this section is intended to require an employer to
permit or accommodate the use.., of marijuana in the workplace or to affect the ability
of employers to have policies restricting the use of marijuana by employees). See also id.
§ 16(6)(d) (permitting those who "occupy, own, or control" property to ban the drug from
their premises).
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juana laws are enacted as statutes, changes to the laws can be accomplished through typical legislative action.2 9 Therefore, because repealing
Amendment 64 would require the approval of a simple majority of Colorado's voters,3 ° Colorado citizens enjoy an enormous amount of power.31
Although repealing the amendment may not be an easy task,
Amendment 64 provides a loophole for municipalities that do not wish to
have cannabis businesses in their communities.32 Local governments are
given wide discretion in enacting ordinances to govern cannabis businesses within their jurisdiction. 33 If a locality desires to prohibit the operation of any state-legal marijuana-related facility, it may enact an ordinance to that end.34
B.

FederalLaw: The ControlledSubstances Act, The Supremacy
Clause, and FederalLaws ProhibitingFinancialServices to Illegal
Enterprises
1.

35
The Supremacy Clause

Regardless of the differences between Colorado marijuana laws and
those of other states, all of the legislation shares one important aspect: it
runs afoul of federal law prohibiting the growth, sale, and use of marijuana. 36 Article VI of the U.S. Constitution declares that federal law "shall
be the supreme Law of the Land. ' '37 According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, federal law preempts state law in three ways. First, Congress can
expressly preempt state law through explicit statutory language. 38 Second, federal law preempts state law if Congress demonstrates their intent
to exclusively occupy an entire regulatory field. 39 Here, in areas tradi29. See Wallach & Hudak, supra note 3.
30. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(3), (4); id. XIX, § 1.
31. See id. V, § 1(2) (stating that the governor has no veto power over referendums).
32. Id. XVIII, § 16(5)(f).
33. Id.
34. COLO. CONSr. art. XVIII, § 16(5)(0.
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
36. See David Blake, Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons, 8
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 359, 360 (2014) (noting that Amendment 64 conflicts with U.S.
Dept. of Justice); Sam Kamin, The Limits of Mar'uanaLegalization in the States, 99 IoWA L. REv. BULL. 39, 39 (2014) ("[Sjtates cannot simply legalize that which the federal
government prohibits."). But see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical
Marijuana and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L.
REv. 1421, 1422 (2009) ("Contrary to conventional wisdom, state laws legalizing conduct
banned by Congress remain in force and, in many instances, may even constitute the de
facto governing law of the land.").
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 77, 78 (1990) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983)).
39. Id. at 79 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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tionally occupied by the states, Congress's intent to "supersede state law
must be 'clear and manifest.' 4 0 Finally, federal law preempts state law
in cases where it is impossible to comply with both federal and state
laws,4 ' or where a state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 42
As Gonzales indicates, Congress did not intend the CSA to preempt
state law, but rather contemplated a state role in the statute. 43 The nation's banking system similarly operates on both federal and state laws, a
feature that has existed for centuries. 44 Thus, according to the preemption doctrine, federal law should trump these state laws only if they
prove to be an obstacle to congressional purpose, or if compliance with
both federal and state laws is impossible. Seemingly, both of these conditions are met, but as will be shown, the federal government declining
enforcement in the area of state-legal marijuana has created an anomaly.
2.

45
The Controlled Substances Act

Congress enacted the CSA in 1970 as part of a larger regulatory
scheme to prevent drug abuse and to control illicit trafficking of regulated and illegal drugs.4 6 To effectuate this goal, the CSA established five
schedules under which to classify all drugs. 47 The CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug.48 Schedule I drugs are characterized as drugs
that have a "high potential for abuse," 49 that have "no currently accepted
medical use, 50 and that lack "accepted safety for use ... under medical
supervision." 51 The CSA declares it unlawful "to manufacture, distribute, or dispense.., a controlled substance., 52 Due to the Supremacy
Clause, state laws permitting these marijuana-related actions presumably
40. Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing, Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice,
331 U.S. at 230)).
41. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
42. Hine v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
43. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 251 (2006). See discussion infra Parts Ill.D,
III.E.
44. See Comptroller of the Currency Adm'r of Nat'l Banks, National Banks and the
Dual Banking System 1 (2003), http://I1.usa.gov/1Ey7sVS [hereinafter Comptroller]
("The federal system is based on a federal bank charter, powers defined under federal
law, operation under federal standards, and oversight by a federal supervisor. The state
system is characterized by state chartering, bank powers established under state law, and
operation under state standards, including oversight by state supervisors.").
45. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2014).
46. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a).
48. Id. at § 812(c)(c)(10) (using the alternate spelling "marihuana").
49. Id. at § 812(b)(1)(A).
50. Id. at § 812(b)(1)(B).
51. Id. at § 812(b)(1)(C).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
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should be struck down because they are in conflict with the CSA.53
There seems to be no way to comply with Colorado state law permitting
54

marijuana-related activities while also complying with federal law.
3.

The Bank Secrecy Act

55

In 1970, Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) based upon
a congressional finding that maintenance and mandatory reporting of fi-

nancial records provided authorities with a high level of aid in criminal
investigations. Specifically, Congress found records revealing account
holders' identities and those authorized to conduct transactions on behalf
of account holders to be particularly helpful.5 7 Thus, the BSA requires
both insured and uninsured financial institutions to keep records of these
individuals' identities.5 The BSA defines "financial institution" broadly
to include institutions such as FDIC-insured banks, 59 insurance companies, 60 and issuers of travelers' checks and money orders. 61 Furthermore,
criminal sanctions be levied upon those
the BSA permits both civil and
62
who willfully violate the Act.
The BSA gives the Secretary of Treasury the authority to promulgate rules in accordance with the Act.63 The Secretary determines which
65
64
records should be maintained, how long the records should be kept,
and which reports should be compiled and filed with the Department of
Treasury.6 6 Specifically, the BSA requires financial institutions to file
Currency Transaction Reports. 67 These reports must be filed for every
"deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer"
53. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963); Hine v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
54. See, e.g., FloridaLime, 373 U.S. at 142.
55. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
56. Id. § 101, at 1115.
57. Id. at 1114.
58. Id. at 1115; id. § 123, at 1117.
59. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 203(e)(1), 84 Stat. at 1119.
60. Id. § 203(e)(13), at 1119.
61. Id. § 203(e)(1 1) ("[A]n issuer, redeemer or cashier of travelers' checks, checks,
money orders, or similar instruments.").
62. Id. §§ 125, 126, at 1117-1118.
63. See Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 101,84 Stat. at 1115; id. §§ 122, 123, at 1116-17; id. §
204, at 1120.
64. Id. §§ 101, 123, at 1115, 1116-17.
65. Id.§ 101, at 1115.
66. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 204, 84 Stat. at 1120, ("The Secretary shall prescribe such
regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this title" which is
specifically Title 11 of the BSA. According to § 202 of Title II, the purpose is "to require
certain reports of records where such reports or records have a high degree of usefulness
in investigations or proceedings.").
67. Id. § 221, at 1122.
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that involves currency of more than $10,000.68 The Secretary also requires the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs"), "a report of
any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation., 69 The regulation designates a transaction as suspicious if it is
conducted (or attempted) and involves at least $5,000. 70 The bank must
also know, suspect, or have reason to suspect 71 that the transaction: (1)
involves funds derived from unlawful activities; 72 (2) is designed to
evade BSA reporting requirements; 73 or (3) has no evident lawful purpose or is not the type of transaction in which the customer usually engages. 74
Additionally, the Secretary prohibits financial institutions from
conducting particular transactions without recording them in monetary
instrument logs. 75 Financial institutions may not issue bank checks or
drafts, cashier's checks, money orders, or travelers' checks for amounts
greater than $3,000, unless particular identifying information is collected
about the purchaser of these monetary instruments.7677 Additionally, the
financial institution must verify the person's identity.
Due to the requirements placed on financial institutions by the BSA
and federal anti-money laundering laws, which will be discussed below,
institutions violate federal laws when they knowingly provide financial
services to marijuana businesses. Compliance with stringent reporting
requirements could provide federal authorities with detailed evidence in
the event they decide to prosecute. Furthermore, these detailed records
would also lead the authorities directly to the financial institutions' customers who work in the marijuana industry.

68.31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2014). "Currency" is defined as the coin and paper money
of the United States or a foreign country, including U.S. silver certificates, U.S. notes,
Federal Reserve notes, and official foreign bank notes. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(m) (2014).
69. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2014).
70. Id. § 1020.320(a)(2).
71. See, e.g., What Banks Look For-Suspicious or Unusual Activity, Cook & Co.,
http://bit.ly/lUl lwgf (last visited July 4, 2015) (describing various situations that banks
may consider suspicious, including transactions that are kept just below the requisite
amount for reporting; transactions that are made at multiple times a day in smaller
amounts, deposited at various bank branches, or with different bank tellers; transactions
conducted by various people on the same account; customers who alter the type or details
of a transaction upon learning that identification is required).
72. Id.§ 1020.320(a)(2)(i).
73. Id.§ 1020.320(a)(2)(ii).
74. Id.§ 1020.320(a)(2)(iii).
75. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.415(a) (2014).
76. Id.(requiring that institutions record name, date of transaction, type of monetary
instrument purchased, serial number, and dollar amount, and sometimes requires social
security number, address, and date of birth).
77. Id. § 1010.415(a)(1)(ii).
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Federal Anti-Money Laundering Laws

4.

After its enactment, Congress has bolstered the BSA by passing various federal money laundering laws. Congress defines money laundering
as the "movement of illicit cash... into, out of, or through the United
States, or... [its] financial institutions., 78 Criminals launder money to
conceal the "proceeds, sources, or nature" of their criminal activities.79
To launder money, proceeds are deposited into a bank account and
moved through a series of transactions to distance the funds from their
source.80 The funds are then integrated into the economy, often mixed
with legitimate funds, thus causing illegal proceeds to be nearly indistinguishable from their legal counterparts.8 1
Initially, Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986,82 which established money laundering as a federal crime. Specifically, the Act amended the BSA to prohibit individuals from organizing
their transactions to evade currency transaction reporting requirements.8 3
The Act also provides for civil and criminal forfeitures for violations of
the BSA.84

In 1992, Congress passed the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act. 85 This Act amended the BSA to permit the Secretary of
Treasury to require the filing of suspicious activity reports as previously
noted. 86 Additionally, the Annunzio-Wylie Act designates penalties for
financial institutions convicted of money laundering, including revocation of bank charters and termination of federal deposit insurance. 87 Because of these anti-money laundering laws, financial institutions face dire
consequences if they choose to offer financial services to marijuana
businesses.
5.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism of 200188

78. Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-310,

§ 5340(2)(A), 112 Stat. 2941,2941 (1998).
79. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Money Laundering, TREASURY.GOV, http://1.usa.gov/
1CZIBIl (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
80. See CHRISTIAN DESILETS & GERALD CLIFF, NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CENTER,

MONEY LAUNDERING 2-3 (2013), http://bit.ly/1DHcH4k.

81. See id.
82. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
83. Id.at § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(B)(ii), (a)(3)(c).
84. Id.at § 1956(b)(4)(A).
85. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044,
§§ 1500-1565 (1992).
86. Id.§ 1517(b)(g)(1), at 4059-60.
87. Id.§ 1502(c)(1)(B), at 4045; id § 1503(a), at 4049; id.§ 1503(b), at 4050.
88. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 111 Stat. 272 (2012).
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("Patriot Act")
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,89 Congress enacted the Patriot Act. Congress intended the Patriot Act to deter
future terrorist attacks and to capture and punish those committing acts
of terror throughout the world.9 Although preventing terrorist activity
may not seem directly related to state-legal marijuana businesses, the Patriot Act nonetheless amended portions of the BSA, providing for stricter
requirements on financial institutions, thus affecting the businesses' access to financial services. 91
The Patriot Act requires financial institutions to establish mandatory
anti-money laundering programs that were previously optional. 92 Although financial institutions are responsible for implementing their own
programs, the programs must meet certain minimum requirements. 93 The
Act also added a section to the BSA concerning the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN").94 In 1990, the Secretary of Treasury
created FinCEN to provide intelligence to law enforcement agencies on
all levels within the country to combat domestic and international money
laundering. 95 The Patriot Act, however, expanded the scope of FinCEN's mission to furnish intelligence information on all financial
policymakers
crimes.9 6 FinCEN was additionally tasked with providing
97
analysis of financial crime patterns around the world.
6.

Administrative Guidance

Although laws have not been passed to address the predicament of
recreational marijuana businesses, the Obama Administration has offered
administrative guidance to help both law enforcement and financial insti-

89. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMM'N REPORT (2004), http://l.usa.gov/17jI0bw (detailing the events of September 11,
2001 when terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and an area of Pennsylvania killing thousands of Americans); Sept.
11th and Its Aftennath: Highlights from the Archives, N.Y. TIMES,
http://nyti.ms/IFDk5ml (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
90. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 111 Stat. at 272.
91. Id. § 351, at 320.
92. Id. § 352(a)(h)(1), at 322.
93. Id. § 352(a)(h)(1)(A)-(D), at 322 (listing the minimum requirements to include:
"the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; the designation of a compliance officer; an ongoing employee training program; and an independent audit function to test programs.").
94. Id. § 361, at 329-32.
95. Treas. Order 105-08 (Apr. 25, 1990).
96. Pub. L. 107-56, § 361, 115 Stat. at 329-32; Treas. Order 180-01 (Mar.24, 2003).
97. Treas. Order 180-01 (Mar. 24,2003).
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tutions navigate this uncharted territory. 98 Deputy Attorney General
Cole issued two memorandums instructing U.S. Attorneys how to approach prosecutorial decisions of marijuana businesses and financial institutions. 99 Additionally, the Department of Treasury, through FinCEN,
issued a memorandum to aid financial institutions in providing banking
services to state-legal marijuana businesses. 00
a. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
("August Cole Memo")
On August 29, 2013, Deputy Attorney General Cole issued a memorandum, addressed to U.S. Attorneys, concerning marijuana enforcement. 01° The August Cole Memo addresses Congress's classification of
marijuana as a dangerous drug and reaffirms the commitment of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to enforcing the CSA based on this congressional determination.10 2 Cole also notes, however, that the DOJ possesses limited resources to deploy in the investigation and prosecution of vioviolators of federal law.10 3 In order to achieve the best balance between
prosecuting criminals and enforcing the CSA, Cole sets out eight federal
priorities about which the DOJ are particularly concerned.10 4 While U.S.
Attorneys are still given prosecutorial discretion, Cole instructs them to
conduct case-by-case analyses to determine whether these federal priorities are implicated and to focus their resources on those individuals and
enterprises.1 °5
Cole expressly articulates an expectation that states, such as Colorado, that have legalized recreational marijuana, will enact and enforce
10 6
rigorous regulatory schemes to govern its growth, sale, and possession.

98. See generally Feb. Cole Memo, supra note 6; FinCEN Guidance, supra note 6;
Aug. Cole Memo, supra note 6.
99. See Feb. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 1; Aug. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 1.
100. See FinCEN Guidance, supra note 6, at 1.
101. Aug. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 1.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1-2. These priorities include preventing: (1) "distribution of marijuana to
minors;" (2) "revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises... ;"
(3) "the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form
to other states;" (4) "state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or
pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;" (5) "violence
and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana;" (6) "drugged
driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with
marijuana use;" (7) "the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public
safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands;" and
(8) "marijuana possession or use on federal property." Id. at 1-2.
105. Aug. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 2, 3.
106. Id. at2.
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The August Cole Memo further declares that jurisdictions with robust
and effective regulation will be less likely to interfere with federal priorienforcement of state and
ties. 10 7 Thus, federal authorities should leave
10 8
local cannabis laws to local law enforcement.
Although the August Cole Memo presumably assures state-legal
marijuana businesses they will not be prosecuted if they comply with
state laws governing marijuana, the memo warns that prosecutors might
choose to disregard the guidance and prosecute them for violations of the
CSA regardless of the guidance. 10 9 Moreover, the memorandum fails to
address concerns that marijuana businesses have in acquiring financial
services. Additionally, the memorandum creates no legal defenses in the
event of prosecution." 0 Seemingly, even if marijuana businesses comply
with Colorado's cannabis laws, the August Cole Memo affords them no
real protection.
b. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
("February Cole Memo")
Six months later, the Deputy Attorney General issued another
memorandum to U.S. Attorneys concerning marijuana enforcement, this
time addressing the financial sector."' In this subsequent memorandum,
Cole clarifies that financial laws, such as the BSA, remain in effect, and
transactions conducted by marijuana businesses may be in violation of
these laws.' 2 Specifically, financial institutions providing services to
state-legal marijuana businesses could be held criminally liable for reporting violations under the BSA. 113 However, due to the limited resources noted before, prosecutors should subject financial crimes to the
"same consideration and prioritization" as described in the August Cole
4
Memo. 1

Although state-legal marijuana businesses acting in compliance
with Colorado law may not implicate federal priorities, the February
Cole Memo instructs financial institutions to continue their "risk-based
anti-money laundering policies."'" 5 Moreover, institutions must still
conduct "customer due diligence" to identify situations that implicate the

107. Id. at 3.
108. Id.

109. Id. at 4.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Aug. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 3.
Feb. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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priorities. 116 Like its August counterpart, the February Cole Memo creates no legal defenses to provide protection to the institutions." 7
c.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Guidance ("FinCEN
Guidance")

On the same day the February Cole Memo was issued, FinCEN released corresponding guidance." 8 FinCEN intended to clarify what was
expected from financial institutions serving marijuana businesses." 9
While hoping to "enhance the availability of financial services for [these]
businesses,' 120 FinCEN Guidance did not remove the obligations banks
have in reporting potentially criminal activities.12 Instead, the guidance
sets out marijuana-specific procedures to follow so that financial institutions may serve these businesses
while still meeting their obligations un122
der the federal banking laws.
FinCEN Guidance provides an extensive list of "red flags" to help
financial institutions determine whether a marijuana business is engaged
in activities that implicate federal priorities.2 3 Moreover, the guidance
gives individual financial institutions the discretion to determine whether
or not to "open, close, or refuse any particular account."' 124 The guidance
stresses customer due diligence as a "critical aspect" of an institution's
assessment of whether to offer financial services to marijuana businesses. 12 Under this principle, banks must verify the identity of its customits customers' banking activiers, the source of their funds, and monitor
12 6
ties continuously to ensure legality.

116. Feb. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 3. See also Genci Bilali, Know Your Customer-Or Not, 43 U. TOL. L. REv. 319, 319, 322-23 (2012) (noting that customer due
diligence is also known as the know-your-customer principle, requiring institutions "to
monitor, audit, collect, and analyze relevant information about their customers (or potential customers) before engaging in financial business with them").
117. Feb. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 3.
118. FinCEN Guidance, supra note 6, at 1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at3.
122. ld. at 2.
123. FinCEN Guidance, supra note 6, at 5 (enumerating "red flags" to include transactions that do not reasonably compare to those of other marijuana businesses in the area;
inability to demonstrate licensing or revenue source; if account holders reside in a different state; if cash deposits are received from outside of the state; if account holder attempts to disguise involvement in the industry; if business declares its involvement in a
non-marijuana business, but deposits cash "smelling of marijuana").
124. Id.
125. Id.at 2.
126. See Bilali, supra note 116, at 322-23) (noting that customer due diligence is also known as the know-your-customer principle, requiring institutions "to monitor, audit,
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According to FinCEN Guidance, financial institutions should continue to file currency transaction reports and SARs for marijuana-related
accounts just as they would for other customers. 127 The guidance creates
separate classes of SARs to address the uniqueness of state-legal marijuana businesses while still furthering the BSA's objective of collecting
and providing law enforcement with access to highly useful information
in criminal investigations: marijuana limited, marijuana priority, and
marijuana termination SARs. 128 After complying with customer due diligence requirements, if banks do not reasonably believe that a marijuana
business's activities violate state law or implicate one of the federal priorities, a marijuana limited SAR should be filed.1 29 On the other hand, if
a financial institution "reasonably believes, based on its customer due
diligence" 130 that a marijuana business's activities do violate state law or
do implicate one or more federal priority, then a marijuana priority SAR
should be filed.131 In the event a financial institution determines it can no
longer maintain a relationship with a marijuana business and comply
with effective anti-money laundering programs, a marijuana termination
13 2
report should be filed explaining the reasons for termination.
Deputy Attorney General Cole's August and February memoranda,
along with FinCEN Guidance, were intended to ease the difficulties
faced by state-legal marijuana businesses and financial institutions. By
operating within the confines of state law, marijuana businesses should
be able to access banking services, as long as their activities do not implicate any of the DOJ's federal priorities. Despite this guidance, however, financial institutions largely
refuse to conduct business with state133
legal marijuana operations.

collect, and analyze relevant information about their customers (or potential customers)
before engaging in financial business with them").
127. See supraPart II.B.2.
128. FinCEN Guidance, supra note 6, at 3, 4, 5.
129.. Id. at 3-4 (indicating that marijuana limited reports must include information to
identify the parties involved, the parties' addresses, and a statement that the filing of the
report occurred only because a marijuana business was involved and no other suspicious
activity has been observed).
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id. (indicating that marijuana priority reports should include "comprehensive
detail" of identifying information about the parties, the specific priorities the bank believes are implicated, and the details of the involved transactions).
132. Id. at 4-5.
133. See Stephens, supra note 8; Geffiher, supra note 12; Williams & Weisbaum, supra note 8.
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

Problem with Administrative Guidance

Although the media lauded the issuance of the DOJ and FinCEN
guidance as a "green light" to financial institutions to do business with
marijuana establishments, the institutions themselves remain wary, and
for good cause. 134 Financial institutions face steep penalties if the DOJ
decides to prosecute them, including civil and criminal sanctions, asset
135
seizure, bank charter revocation, and loss of federal deposit insurance.
Furthermore, financial institutions' employees, directors, and officers all
face civil and criminal penalties, including lifetime bans from the banking industry, if the DOJ decides to prosecute for the facilitation of federally unlawful transactions.1 36 Financial institutions have largely determined that the benefits of providing
services to the lucrative marijuana
37
industry do not outweigh the risks. 1
Administrative guidance lacks the force of law and does not afford
any legal defenses in the event of prosecution.131 In essence, the federal
government is simply choosing to look the other way, at least for the
time being. 39 However, the next presidential administration, which will
take office after the November 2016 general election, could decide it no
longer wishes to look the other way. The new administration could easi134. See Danielle Douglas, Obama Administration Clears Banks to Accept Funds
from Legal Marijuana Dealers, WASHINGTON
POST,
Feb.
14, 2014,
http://wapo.st/17As7x9; Andrew Grossman, Banks to be Allowed to do Business with
MarijuanaDispensaries:Federal Regulator Issues Guidance to Address Contradictory
Laws, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 14, 2014, http://on.wsj.com/1OuzV3o; David
Migoya & Allison Sherry, Banks Given the Go-Ahead on Working with MarijuanaBusinesses, DENVER POST, Feb. 14,2014, http://dpo.st/1LKOMuO.
135. See Grossman, supra note 134 ("[B]anks that provide support for those activities face the risk of prosecution and assorted sanctions."); Stephens, supra note 8
("[Blanks that followed the guidance could be exposed to civil or criminal liability.");
Williams & Weisbaum, supra note 8 (listing federal penalties banks face, including "civil
money penalties, fines.., withdrawal of FDIC insurance"); AMERICAN BANKING AssoCIATION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: MARIJUANA AND BANKING 1 (2014),
http://www.aba.com/Tools/
CommTools/Documents/ABAMarijuanaAndBankingFAQ
Feb20l4.pdf.
136. See Sullum, Marjuana Money, supra note 9; Williams & Weisbaum, supra
note 8 (noting that individuals can face a lifetime ban from the banking world). See supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3.
137. See Femer, House Votes, supra note 12 (estimating the national legal marijuana
market to reach $2.3 billion in 2014 and exceed $10 billion by 2019); Stephens, supra
note 8 (estimating marijuana sales in Colorado nearing $1 billion in 2014); Geffner, supra note 12; Williams & Weisbaum, supra note 8.
138. See supra Parts II.B.5.a & II.B.5.b.
139. Billy Hamilton, Joint Venture: Colorado, Washington, and the Great Pot Experiment, STATE TAX NOTES MAGAZINE, June 16, 2014, at 647, available at LEXIS, 72
State Tax Notes 647.
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ly repeal the guidance and instruct the DOJ to begin prosecuting all violators of the CSA and banking laws, especially if the new administration
wishes to thwart the growing trend of legalized recreational marijuana
among the states. Furthermore, if banks and businesses trust the guidance and begin conducting business with one another, if and when the
new administration chooses to eliminate the guidance, the government
will have a database of individuals to prosecute through the marijuanarelated SARs. With the precarious character of this guidance, it is unsurprising that banks are less than eager to accommodate the cannabis industry.
B.

Effect of FinancialLaws on MarijuanaEstablishments

Marijuana establishments that are unable to acquire banking services find themselves operating on an entirely cash basis. This means
these businesses not only accept cash from their customers, but that they
must pay their employees, their suppliers, their utilities, and their taxes
entirely in cash as well. 140 At first glance, a cash-only business may not
seem particularly problematic, but an analysis of what "cash-only" entails exposes the many difficulties and dangers this model presents.
1. Crime
Perhaps the most glaring danger posed by a cash-only business
model is the vulnerability to burglaries and robberies that results from
storing immense amounts of untraceable cash. 141 According to a local
news report, Denver Police encountered 49 burglaries and 1 robbery of
marijuana businesses in the first quarter of 2014.142 Marijuana establishments are attractive to thieves, because when "[y]ou hit a 7-Eleven,
you'll get 20 bucks. [But when] [y]ou hit a dispensary, you'll get
$300,000 on a good day." 143 Additionally, strict zoning regulations further entice criminals to target marijuana businesses because marijuana
facilities are restricted largely to remote, sparsely populated, industrial
areas. 44 These conditions have forced many marijuana businesses to
140. See Geffner, supranote 12.
141. See Hughes, supra note 10.
142. See Mariyuana Industry Skeptical of Banking Bill, Beefs Up Security, CBS
DENVER, MAY 12, 2014, http://cbsloc.ahlg2NtXy [hereinafter CBS Denver, Beefs Up Security].
143. Tony Dokoupil & Bill Briggs, High Crimes: Robber Gangs Terrorize Colorado
Pot Shops, NBC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2014, http://nbcnews.to/1 kUFIBy (quoting Denver District
Attorney Mitch Morrissey).
144. See Hughes, supra note 10 ("[S]tores and grow operations are in remote industrial areas."); Vice: Rocky Mountain High & North Korean Defectors (HBO television
broadcast Apr. 25, 2014) (interviewing Ted Daniels, owner of Blue Line Protection
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hire armed security guards, 14 5 employees who hold concealed-carry permits, 146 armored truck services, and security firms that specialize in the
cannabis industry. 147 Despite
these precautions, marijuana businesses
48
remain targets for criminals. 1
2.

Efforts to Acquire Banking Services

While some facilities are dealing with the all-cash conundrum, other
cannabis establishments attempt to circumvent the banks' refusal to do
business with the marijuana industry. For example, some owners use
their personal bank accounts rather than attempting to open business accounts. 149 Additionally, other owners play "cat and mouse" with banks,
attempting to hide the source of their funds by using holding companies
to open bank accounts or business names that mask the true character of
their business. 150 These actions typically result in businesses receiving
banking services for a few months before banks "get wise" and close
these accounts. 151 Those individuals attempting to mislead banks as to
their business's true nature may run into problems when depositing their
cash. FinCEN's long list of red flags contains a roadblock for these
sneaky account holders: if cash possesses the scent of marijuana and the
business purports to be non-marijuana related, the bank should investiGroup, who describes the heightened security threat due to strict zoning laws that place
marijuana businesses in isolated and dangerous areas).
145. See Hughes, supra note 10 (stating that marijuana businesses are required by
state law to have security systems and cameras, but that many businesses also hire armed
guards as well).
146. See Stephens, supra note 8.
147. See Hughes, supra note 10 (interviewing CEO of Blue Line Protection Group, a
marijuana security firm that employs former law enforcement officers and former military); CBS Denver, Beefs Up Security, supranote 142 (interviewing CEO of Canna Security America, which serves exclusively the cannabis industry and helped formulate regulations which mandate high tech security systems for marijuana establishments).
148. See Hughes, supra note 10 (quoting Sean Campbell, CEO of Blue Line Protection Group, stating, "[y]ou're effectively creating a magnet for crime").
149. See Geffner, supra note 12; Planet Money, Episode 420: The (Legal)Mariuana Business, NPR (Dec. 4, 2012), http://n.pr/1KsB7Gt [hereinafter Planet Money].
150. See Hughes, supra note 10; Geffner, supra note 12; Alison Vekshin, Pot Shops
Can't Take American Express of Deposit in Banks, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 12, 2013
8:00 PM), http://bloom.bg/llyljBL.
151. See Hughes, supra note 10 (noting that marijuana business owners are able to
keep bank accounts open for a few months before banks close the accounts); Stephens,
supra note 8 (noting that a co-founder of a marijuana dispensary had access to banking
services, but the bank shut down his accounts after receiving a telephone call from the
Drug Enforcement Agency); Geffier, supra note 12 ("Such accounts are likely to be denied or terminated once the bank gets wise to the try type of business."); Vekshin, supra
note 150 (explaining that financial institutions terminate services without notice upon
discovering the "subterfuge" of marijuana businesses using innocent-sounding names or
personal accounts for their business needs).
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gate further. 152 The smell of cannabis is unique and difficult to describe
because so many different strains exist, but by and large, marijuana
smells similar to a skunk's spray. 1 3 If cash is kept in the same safe or
vault as marijuana, the marijuana's odor latches onto the money and
15 4
causes concern when the bills are brought to the bank.
Some lucky owners of marijuana businesses report that banks are
willing to do business with them.' 55 The CEO of a prominent marijuana
products manufacturer claims his company has "strong banking relationships," but simply does not discuss them with others. 56 Presumably, if
word circulated that specific institutions were accepting cannabis accounts, the provision of financial services would cease. The president of
the Colorado Bankers Association warns institutions to "[s]erve these
customers at your own risk."' 157 FinCEN's director announced in August
2014 that 105 banks and credit unions were currently providing services
to marijuana businesses. 58 She declined, however, to disclose the names
or locations of these institutions. 59 Financial institutions' desire to remain anonymous, along with requests that marijuana businesses stay quiet about acquired banking services, lend support to the theory that financial institutions distrust the administrative guidance.
3. Non-Cannabis-Related Third Party Effects
Some non-cannabis businesses also find themselves without bank160
ing services because they provide services to the marijuana industry.
Several banks have refused to provide banking services to a Colorado
lawyer due to the clients she represents as part of her specialized practice
in tax and marijuana law.' 61 The president of an Ohio company, which
manufacturers oil extraction equipment, found his accounts closed after
he opened deposit accounts for his customers to prevent them from

152. FinCEN Guidance, supra note 6, at 6.
153. See Barbara Brotman, Skunk Smell SpreadingLike Weed Through City, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 2, 2012, http://trib.in/17AsoAj.
154. Planet Money, supra note 149.
155. See Douglas, Banks Slowly Welcoming, supra note 13; Sullum, Marijuana
Money, supra note 9; Williams & Weisbaum, supra note 8.
156. Sullum, MarijuanaMoney, supra note 9 (interviewing CEO of Dixie Elixirs &
Edibles in Denver, about where he stores his cash); See also Douglas, Banks Slowly Welcoming, supra note 13 (quoting the spokeswoman for the National Cannabis Industry Association stating that members who have secured banking services have been told not to
discuss it).
157. Sullum, MariuanaMoney, supra note 9.
158. See Douglas, Banks Slowly Welcoming, supranote 13.
159. See id.
160. See Hughes, supra note 10.
161. See id.
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transporting large amounts of cash. 162 Subsequently, numerous banks
denied the Ohio company president's loan applications to expand his
63
company because its profits were derived from the marijuana industry.1
Presumably, if banks refused services to account holders who conduct business with state-legal marijuana businesses, the ripple effect
could be felt nationally, as evidenced by the dilemma of the Ohio company. What about utility companies that provide electricity, water, and
natural gas to cannabis businesses? Are they at risk of losing access to
financial services? They are, after all, doing business with marijuana establishments. If financial institutions are in danger of prosecution for
aiding and abetting marijuana distribution by providing these services,
then seemingly, so is every other establishment that provides marijuana
businesses with various services and supplies. The implications of this
stance are extraordinarily far-reaching.
4. Payments of Payroll, Vendors, and Taxes
A further problem facing marijuana businesses is their ability to
64
make payments: to vendors, to employees, and to the government. 1
Vendors who receive large cash payments may find themselves in the
same boat as marijuana businesses-facing the dangers involved in
transporting large amounts of money. Moreover, paying bills in cash is
time-consuming. Because sending cash through the mail is ill advised,
as it could easily get lost, marijuana businesses likely pay their utilities in
person. The United States Postal Service advises the purchase of money
orders as an alternative to mailing cash. 165 However, because financial
institutions are largely not offering these services to marijuana businesses, owners are back at square one.
Employers must pay their employees wages, but without bank accounts, cannabis establishments must distribute payroll in cash. 166 This

162. Connor Adam Sheets, MarijuanaIndustry: Congress Helping Pot Growers Become More Attractive Partnerfor Banks, INT'L Bus. TIMEs (July 18, 2014, 2:00 PM),
http://bit.ly/1VHq6Ve (reporting that the bank terminated accounts upon determining the
number of deposits being made resembled money laundering).
163. Id. Cannabis extraction equipment is used to extract cannabis oil from the marijuana plant. Cannabis oil is a more potent form of marijuana. See Extraction:A Complex
and Potentially Dangerous Art, CANNLABS, http://bit.ly/lKsBa5n (last visited July 4,
2015).
164. See Femer, House Votes, supra note 12; Geffhier, supra note 12; Sullum, MarijuanaMoney, supra note 9.
165. See UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, A CUSTOMER'S GUIDE TO MAILING 22

(2014), http://l.usa.gov/1U 120Dd.
166. See Ferner, House Votes, supra note 12 ("[C]reating issues involving... employee payroll."); Geffier, supra note 12 ("[B]usinesses also pay their employees ...
cash.").

in
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means workers are walking around with cash, at least until they make it
to their own bank (which is hopefully oblivious to their occupations, as
they might lose their accounts). And thus, these employees become targets of thieves.
Federal taxes present an additional issue due to a ten percent tax the
167
Internal Revenue Service levies on employment taxes paid in cash.
This could add up to an exorbitant amount in penalties resulting from
circumstances outside of the taxpayer's control. 168 Additionally, while
some marijuana businesses likely keep meticulous records to ensure their
compliance with the laws, 169 without a payroll paper trail, those businesses that choose to skirt the rules could easily avoid collecting taxes
from their employees to forward to the government and simply pay their
workers under the table.
Relatedly, although the businesses are unlawful under federal law,
marijuana establishments must pay taxes to Colorado and the federal
government, like any other business. 70 Paying these taxes, as well as licensing fees, becomes tricky when the only method to do so is to use
cash. One business owner reported that he pays roughly $35,000 in sales
tax to the state every month.171 He pays another $45,000 annually to
cover his licensing fees in Denver. 7 2 To remit these payments, this
business owner must bring thousands of dollars in cash to Colorado's
Department of Revenue ("DOR"). 173 Upon arrival at the DOR, presumably a DOR employee must account for the cash to assure the tax or fee is
paid in full. Then, the DOR likely must solve the problem of where to
store the large amount of cash and how to transport the money to its
bank.
Moreover, without a paper trail of the revenue earned and the business's outgoing overhead costs, white-collar crime, such as tax evasion,

167. See Hughes, supra note 10; Stephens, supra note 8; Sullum, Marijuana Money
supra note 9.
168. See Hughes, supra note 10 (stating that "[w]ith some marijuana businesses paying payroll taxes of $100,000 a quarter, those penalties are substantial). See also Sullum,
MarijuanaMoney, supra note 9 (detailing a recent IRS dispute where a marijuana business unsuccessfully challenged the ten percent penalty in U.S. Tax Court based on payments in cash are not within his control).
169. See Stephens, supra note 8.
170. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961) (clarifying when Congress amended the Income Tax Act of 1913, the omission of the word "lawful" proved
that Congress intended to tax income derived from both legal and illegal sources).
171. Vekshin, supranote 150.
172. 1d.
173. Id. See also Hughes, supranote 10 (describing the various ways in which marijuana business owners bring their payments into the DOR, including shoeboxes, locked
briefcases, buckets).
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could more easily be perpetrated. 174 Cash-only businesses frustrate efforts to conduct audits of business records and trace transactions.1 75
Without measures in place to corroborate the income marijuana busithe federal governnesses or their vendors report to the IRS, how does
1 76
due?
is
it
taxes
the
of
all
receiving
is
it
know
ment
Furthermore, the financial handling of these taxes that marijuana
businesses have paid their local government, the Colorado DOR, and the
IRS presents an anomaly. While cannabis establishments are unable to
keep their money in the bank, these respective government entities seem
to have no problem keeping the revenue they acquire from the marijuana
industry in their financial institutions. Specifically, J.P. Morgan Chase &
Co., among others, maintains a policy of not offering services to the marijuana industry.177 However, J.P. Morgan Chase is one of three financial
178
institutions that contract with the state of Colorado to hold their funds,
funds that clearly include tax revenues derived from the marijuana industry. The General Counsel of the American Bankers Association (ABA)
attempts to reconcile this inconsistency by explaining that tax dollars are
legal even when derived from illegal sources.180179 However, even the
ABA acknowledges, "this is not entirely clear."'
Marijuana businesses face many difficulties due to their inability to
access banking services, and these difficulties affect those who conduct
business with them as well as those who regulate the industry. The lack
of faith displayed by banks in the administrative guidance inhibits the
marijuana industry's efforts to operate as a legitimate industry. The general consensus is that additional measures must be taken to address this
issue.I18
174. See Ferner, House Votes, supra note 12 (quoting Colorado Representative Ed
Perlmutter stating that the potential for both white collar and violent crime are somewhat
substantial for all-cash businesses); Sullum, Marijuana Money, supra note 9 ("[T]ax collectors should worry about the opportunities for evasion that a cash-only business offers.").
175. See Vekshin, supra note 150.
176. A bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives which would amend
the IRS tax code to provide for excise taxes on marijuana sales and distributions. The bill
would also require a permit for anyone involved in a "marijuana enterprise." The bill was
introduced on February 20, 2015 and assigned to committee, but not further action has
been taken. See H.R. Res. 1014, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1014-Marjuana Tax Revenue
Act of 2015, GOVTRACK.US, http://bit.ly/1l1ylGwj (last visited July 4, 2015).
177. Grossman, supra note 134.
178. Migoya, supra note 9.
179. See Megan Michiels, The Cannabis Conundrum: The Changing Legal Landscape for Marijuana Use Puts Banks in Several Difficult Spots, ABA BANKING JOURNAL,

Feb. 2014, at 32.
180. Id.

181. See sources cited supra note 13; See also Williams & Weisbaum, supra note 8
("This guidance ...[is] not enough"); Sheets, supra note 162 (quoting a partner in a Chi-
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Legislative Efforts to Address the Issue

Although it may seem that the simplest solution is for the federal
legislature to act, immediate congressional action seems unlikely. The
113th Congress, which ended on January 5, 2015, took the title of the
second least productive Congress in modem history 8 2 and was often referred to as a "do nothing Congress."' 18 3 Instead of tackling the recrea-

tional marijuana problem, Congress allowed proposed solutions to die at
the committee level. 8 4 On April 22, 2015, a bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives that would exempt from the CSA those who

comply with state marijuana laws.'8 5186The bill was assigned to a committee, but has not yet been voted upon.
1. Failed Attempts in United States Congress
In July 2013, Representative Ed Perlmutter of Colorado introduced
the Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act, which would have

provided a "safe harbor" for financial institutions wishing to offer banking services to marijuana businesses.' 8 7 The bill, however, was referred
to the committee in September and never emerged for a vote. 8 8 The bill
was reintroduced to the 114th Congress on April 28, 2015, but no action
has been taken. 89 Additionally, Colorado Representative Jared Polis incago law firm stating that permitting lenders to lend funds to legal businesses without
fear is one of the most important federal priorities "by more than just government guidance").
182. See Mark Murray, 113th Congress Not the Least Productivein Modern History,
NBC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2014, http://nbcnews.to/1JXYXHQ.
183. 113th Congress Set to Become the Most "Do Nothing Congress" on Record,
NAACP, http://bit.ly/1HSL4t4, (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); see Manu Raju, The (really)
Do Nothing Congress, POLITICO (Nov. 22, 2013 4:12 PM), http://politi.co/lerdKi7;
Becky Sarwate, 113th Congress Produces 22% of "Do Nothing" 1947-1948 Counterpart,POLITICUS USA (Dec. 20, 2014, 2:13 PM), http://bit.ly/1DHdlcB.
184. While Congress did nothing to progress a solution for recreational marijuana,
they did pass a spending bill, which prohibits federal funds to be used in prosecuting
"state-legal cannabis programs" in states that have legalized the drug for medical purposes. See Matt Ferner, Congress Passes Historic Medical MarijuanaProtections in Spending Bill, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 14, 2014, http://huff.to/lvOwGbL.

However, the same

Congress did not allow a similar measure to pass concerning recreational marijuana as
discussed infra Part III.C. I.
185. H.R. Res. 1940, 114th Cong. (2015).
186. See H.R. 1940-Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2015, GOVTRACK.US,
http://bit.ly/lIp7UKq (last visited July 4, 2015). Govtrack.us estimates a zero percent
chance of this bill being enacted.
187. H.R. Res. 2652, 113th Cong. §2 (2013).
188. See HR.2652-MariuanaBusinesses Access to Banking Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, http://l.usa.gov/1MQqdl4 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
189. H.R. Res. 2076, 114th Cong. (2015). See H.R. 2076-MarijuanaBusinesses Access to Banking Act of 2015, GOVTRACK.US, http://bit.ly/1LMbb7I (last visited July 4,
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troduced the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013 in February 2014, which would have removed marijuana from Schedule I drug
classification. 190 After being referred to the same subcommittee as its
predecessor, this bill also died without action. 19'

In a more promising display, the Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations Act passed the House of Representatives on
July 16, 2014, with 228 votes in favor of and 195 votes against it.' 92 This

bill was introduced in an effort to prohibit federal funds from being used
to penalize financial institutions that offer banking services to state-legal
marijuana businesses. 193 The bill was received in the Senate and referred
to the Appropriations Committee, where it met the same fate as the other
194

recreational marijuana legislation introduced in the 113th Congress.
While bipartisan support exists for solving the marijuana banking problem, a recent Gallup poll found that Republicans tend to be less receptive
than Democrats, with only 39 percent of Republicans supporting legal
marijuana compared to 64 percent of Democrats. 195 Now that Republicans dominate Congress, if congressmen mirror their Republican voter
counterparts on marijuana issues, a prompt congressional solution seems
unlikely in the near future.
2. Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act96

On March 5, 2014, the Colorado Senate adopted Senate Resolution
14-003, which declared that the best solution to the lack of financial services provided for the marijuana industry is "comprehensive federal leg2015). Govtrack.us offers a prognosis of zero percent chance that this legislation will be
passed.
190. H.R. Res. 499, 113th Cong. (2014).
191. See H.R.499-Ending Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV,
http://1.usa.gov/lD3HTQj (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
192. H.R.5016: FinancialServices and General Government Appropriations Act,
2015, GOVTRACK.US, http://bit.ly/1MuZi7F (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (breaking down
the July 16, 2014 vote on the bill).
193. H.R. Res. 5016, 113th Cong. § 916 (2014).
194. See H.R.5016-FinancialServices and General Government Appropriations
Act, 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, http://1.usa.gov/1HSLn7i (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
195. Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S., GALLUP.COM (Nov. 6, 2014) http://bit.lyt1GckZUa (noting also that 73 percent of liberals, 31
percent of conservatives and 58 percent of moderates support marijuana legalization); See
also, Pew Research Center, America's New Drug Policy Landscape, (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://pewrsr.ch/lmWHkLI (reporting Feb. 2014 poll results of 59% of Republicans
against and 39% in favor of marijuana legalization); Pollingreport.com,
http://bit.ly/1Jo2Gzq (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (reporting multiple partisan support
polls: a Jan. 2014 CNN poll revealed 34% of Republicans in favor of and 64% against
legalization and a Feb. 2014 CBS News poll resulted in 36% of Republicans in favor of
and 61% against legalization).
196. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-33-101 to -128 (2014).
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islation authorizing banks and credit unions to serve legal marijuana ...
businesses."' 97 Although Colorado called for Congress to act, it did not
sit quietly and await a congressional solution. Instead, the Colorado
General Assembly passed its own legislation to address the banking dilemma. 198
The Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act passed both the
House and Senate of the Colorado General Assembly in May and was
signed into law by the governor on June 6, 2014.199 The Cooperatives
Act amends Title 11 of the Colorado Revised Statutes to add a section
devoted to the establishment of cooperatives to offer banking services to
legal marijuana businesses within the state. 200 A cooperative is a business that functions democratically and is formed by a group of likeminded people for a collective purpose.20 1 Member-owners pool their
2 In
resources to provide services for which they have a common need. 2020
3
credit.
and
this case, the common need is access to financial accounts
The Assembly issued its findings concerning the negative effect the
lack of banking services has on the state, such as increased crime and the
inability of the state to accurately track and verify the revenue of marijuana establishments.20 4 Additionally, the Assembly clarified that cannabis
cooperatives are not banks or credit unions that benefit from federal deposit insurance.20 5 The lack of FDIC or NCUA protection, in addition to
the lack of full faith and credit backing, must be disclosed to customers
along with the acknowledgement that funds may still be subject to seizure by the federal government.20 6 Moreover, access to these cooperatives would be limited to only those marijuana businesses that can prove
they are unable to secure banking services elsewhere.20 7 Furthermore,
cooperative services would not be available to individuals regardless of
208
licensing.

197.
198.
199.
LAw360,

Colo. S. Res. 14-003, at 5.
See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-22-101 to -128 (2014).
See Daniel Wilson, Colo. Gov. Signs World-First Marijuana Co-Op Law,
June 6, 2014, http://bit.ly/IlymQI3.

200. See Marijuana Financial Services Cooperatives Act, H.B. 1398, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., §§ 1 (Colo. 2014) (enacted June 6, 2014 as COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1133-101 to -128 (2014)).

201. See What is a Cooperative?, COOP.
http://bit.ly/lGRKMyC (last visited Feb. 2,2015).
202. See id.
203. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-33-104(1).
204. Id. § 11-33-102(B).
205. See id. § 11-33-108(1)(A).
206. Id. § 11-33-106(4)(A).
207. Id. § 11-33-104(1).
208. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-33-106(2).
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Cannabis cooperatives would also be held to the same due diligence
standards as banks, including ensuring that their customers' actions are
not implicating any of the DOJ's federal priorities. 20 9 All eight federal
priorities are expressly incorporated into the text of the Cooperatives Act
itself.210 Additionally, cooperatives must comply with all federal requirements, such as the BSA and SARs filing.2 11 Presumably, cannabis
cooperatives are not intended to be a permanent solution to the marijuana
banking problem. A provision in the Cooperatives Act declares that cooperatives would potentially be unnecessary in the event that federal deposit insurance is extended to banks meant to provide services to marijuana businesses. 212
Although the Cooperatives Act has been signed into law, a substantial hurdle still impedes the successful implementation of the cannabis
cooperatives.2 3 According to the Cooperatives Act, the Federal Reserve
System must approve the bill, specifically with respect to merchant services such as debit and credit card processing.2 14 Critics speculate, however, that, due to the absence of federal deposit insurance, the Federal
Reserve will likely withhold its approval. 1 5 Perhaps if Colorado could
provide an alternative to FDIC insurance, such as pooling marijuana tax
revenues to create state insurance for cooperative deposits, the Federal
Reserve may give the bill the go-ahead. Additionally, if the state could
provide an alternative to merchant services, such as cashless ATMs located in marijuana retail stores, then the Federal Reserve's approval may
be unnecessary.
Without the Federal Reserve's stamp of approval, the Cooperatives
Act appears obsolete unless the Act is amended to remove the need for
its approval. This leads one to wonder if Colorado can solve this problem without federal assistance. Colorado would not be the first state to
devise a plan addressing an issue the state felt compelled to solve in the
absence of federal action. In 1994, Oregon voters approved a ballot
measure to legalize a form of physician-assisted suicide, resulting in the
enactment of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act2 16 ("ODWDA"). In
209. Id. § 1l-33-126(D)(2)(A).
210. Id.
211. Id. § 11-33-126(A), (D).
212. See id. § 11-33-104(3)(A).
213. See Ivan Moreno, ColoradoLaw Sets Up World's FirstMarijuanaBanks; Feds
Must Ok, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, June 6,2014, http://bit.ly/1MQqryT.
214. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-33-104(4)(A). See also ColoradoLawmakers Approve
Planfor Pot Banking, NY POST, May 8, 2014, http://bit.ly/1Id6dg (reporting that Colorado must "ask the U.S. Federal Reserve System to let them access so-called "merchant
services," a broad category that includes accepting credit cards").
215. See Keith Coffman, ColoradoLawmakers OK Co-Op Banking Optionfor MarijuanaSellers, REUTERS (May 8, 2014, 1:45 AM), http://reut.rs/lnwk6wN.
216. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (2013).
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2006, the issue made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court when Oregon
challenged federal action to thwart the ODWDA.2 17 The Court, although
not directly ruling on the constitutionality of the ODWDA, let the statute
stand and found that governing the state's medical practice was well
within Oregon's traditional police powers.218 By relying on the treatment
of police powers in Gonzales v. Oregon, Colorado can go forward with
the Cooperatives Act if it amends the Act to remove the need for Federal
Reserve approval.
D.

Gonzales v. Oregon

By enacting the ODWDA, Oregon asserted its police powers to regulate the medical field within the state. The ODWDA permits statelicensed physicians to prescribe lethal doses of Schedule II controlled
substances to terminally ill patients who wish to end their lives. 21 9 Those
physicians who choose to act under the ODWDA are exempt from civil
and criminal liability for doing so. 220 The Act possesses a number of
safeguards to ensure the proper results intended under the Act. Oregon
residents who wish to acquire a lethal prescription must have a diagnosis
from their primary physician that confirms the he or she has an "incurable or irreversible disease that, within reasonable medical judgment, will
cause death within six months., 221 This determination must receive a
concurring opinion by a second physician, who must examine the patient
and review his or her medical records.222 Additionally, the primary physician must ensure that the patient's request has been made voluntarily
and that the patient has given informed consent.223 In the event that the
patient is suffering from depression or a psychological disorder, the physician must refer the patient to counseling.22 4 The ODWDA, furthermore, prohibits physicians from administering the legal drug themselves.225
In 1997, Congress invited the Drug Enforcement Agency to prosecute physicians who acted under the ODWDA as violators of the CSA,
but Attorney General Janet Reno found the authority for such action
lacking. 226 In 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft, however, disagreed

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 254 (2006).
Id. at 274-75.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.885. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 248.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.885. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 248.
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 252. See ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.815, 127.800(12).
ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.800(8).
Id. § 127.815.
Id.§ 127.825.
Id. § 127.880.
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 252-53.
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and issued an Interpretive Rule, stating physician-assisted suicide is not a
"legitimate medical purpose" and the prescription of lethal doses to assist
in suicide is illegal under the CSA. 27
Oregon responded to the rule by filing suit in federal court, joined
by a physician, pharmacist, and a few terminally ill patients.22 8 The district court found for the Oregon plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing the rule. 229 The Ninth
Circuit upheld the injunction, reasoning, "the Interpretive Rule altered
the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government' without the requisite clear statement that the CSA authorized
such action. '' 230 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 23' and held
that the Attorney General lacked the broad authority under the CSA
needed to issue the rule restricting physicians from prescribing lethal
doses of controlled substances when permitted under state law. 232 Furthermore, the Gonzales Court recognized that the CSA did not intend to
preempt state action in this field.233
The Supreme Court could have explicitly addressed the constitutionality of the ODWDA, but refrained from doing so. Instead, the Court
noted that the CSA contemplates a state role in regulating controlled substances 234 and that the medical field falls under the police powers traditionally reserved for the states.2 35 This Gonzales decision has been interpreted to show that, by affirming the Ninth Circuit ruling that physicianassisted suicide under the ODWDA was not violative of the CSA, the
U.S. Supreme Court, "for all [i]ntents and purposes," was upholding the
constitutionality of the Act.236 This interpretation came from a state
court, however, and carries no binding precedent. Yet, it could have persuasive value if Colorado found itself defending the constitutionality of
the Cooperatives Act.
E.

Colorado'sSolution

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, Oregon v. Gonzales was determined on the basis of health care being firmly within the realm of a

227. Id.at 254.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.at 255 (quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (2004)).
231. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255.
232. Id. at 274-75.
233. Id.at 251.
234. Id.
235. Id.at 270, 274.
236. Konopka-Sauer v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 190078/08, 2011 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11,2011).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1

237

Traditional police powers are not
state's traditional police powers.
found expressly in the U.S. Constitution.235 Instead, the phrase is ajudicial creation, first coined by Chief Justice Marshall. 9 Police powers,
"commonly equated with powers of sovereignty, especially with respect
to the states, 240 "extend to the protection of public health, safety, welfare, and morals."'241 As previously discussed, the cash-only nature of the

marijuana industry poses a threat to the safety of Colorado's citizens,242
and its inability to accurately track taxes presumably affects Colorado's
revenue, which in turn affects its citizens' welfare. Thus, the state could
cite its traditional police powers as its authority to provide a state-based
solution to the cash-only problem.
Although the banking dilemma stems from the federal banking
laws, the problem originates with the CSA's characterization of marijuana as a Schedule I drug. As the Gonzales Court noted, the "CSA explicitly contemplates a role for the States in regulating controlled substances,
Thus, the Gonzales
as evidenced by its pre-emption provision.'
Court's determination that the CSA does not preempt all state law provides additional support for Colorado's authority to handle this issue itself.
As exhibited by the various federal banking laws discussed, the federal government regulates financial institutions. 244 However, the banking
structure in the United States is a "dual banking system," meaning that
"parallel state and federal banking systems ... co-exist., 245 Although the
Cooperatives Act expressly denies that cannabis cooperatives are banks
or credit unions and prohibits them from using these designations,24 6 the
cooperatives undoubtedly qualify as financial institutions under the

237. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 274.
238. See Christopher Supino, The Police Power and "Public Use": Balancing the
PrincipleInterest Against PrivateRights Through PrincipledConstitutionalDistinctions,
110 W. VA. L. REv. 711, 722 (2008).
239. See id (quoting Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 431 (1827), "The
power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States .... Indeed, the laws of the United
States expressly sanction the health laws of a State.").
240. David A. Thomas, Finding More Piecesfor the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can ClarifyDoctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 497, 510 (2004).
241. Supino, supra note 238, at 723 n.46 (quoting Christopher Wolfe, Moving Beyond Rhetoric, 57 FLA. L. REv. 1065, 1075).
242. See supra Part III.B. 1.
243. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 251 (2006).
244. See supra Parts II.B.3, II.B.4, II.B.5.
245. Comptroller, supra note 44, at 1.
246. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-33-108(1)(A).
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BSA.247 Therefore, Colorado could rely on its ability to charter statebased financial institutions under the dual banking system to authorize
the cannabis cooperatives.
An important aspect of Colorado's ability to effectuate this plan is
the implementation of safeguards. The DOJ based both the August and
February Cole Memos on the assumption that the states enacted robust
regulatory schemes to govern their legal marijuana industries.248 One
might assume from the absence of federal prosecutions of state-legal marijuana businesses that the regulatory structures are operating as expected. Along with Colorado's stringent laws governing the recreational
marijuana industry, the Cooperatives Act includes restrictions to ensure
compliance with the guidance offered by the DOJ and FinCEN, such as
including the DOJ's federal priorities and requiring that cooperatives
comply with all pertinent federal laws.2 4 9 These safeguards ensure that
the cooperatives do not operate as a free-for-all, providing services to
anyone who walks through their doors. Instead, the Cooperatives Act,
like the ODWDA, requires certain conditions to be met before the benefits of the Act take effect. 250 The Gonzales Court noted that Oregon did
not simply decriminalize physician-assisted suicide, but limited the prescription of lethal doses for that purpose to terminally ill patients who
meet certain criteria.25 ' Similarly, Colorado is not creating cannabis cooperatives to provide indiscriminate banking services to every marijuanarelated business. Rather, Colorado ensures that services are offered only
to specific businesses that meet particular conditions as set out in the Cooperatives Act. 252
To be sure, cooperatives would face similar problems as banks do in
providing marijuana businesses with financial services through their
compliance with federal regulations. However, because cannabis cooperatives are member-owned, the members already function in a gray legal area by operating state-legal marijuana businesses that are technically
illegal under federal law. By deciding to enter the marijuana industry,
these business owners have already placed themselves at risk of prosecution. Additionally, marijuana business owners seemingly placed faith in
the August Cole Memo that advised they would not face prosecution if
they adhered to Colorado law and did not implicate federal priorities.

247. See Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 203(e)(11), 84 Stat. 1114, 1119
(including "an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of travelers' checks, checks, money orders, or
similar instruments" in the definition of "financial institution").
248. See Feb. Cole Memo, supranote 6, at 3; Aug. Cole Memo, supra note 6, at 3.
249. See supra Parts ILA, III.C.2.
250. See supra Part III.C.2.
251. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271 (2006).
252. See supra Part 1II.C.2.
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Having already taken the risk, marijuana business owners are invested in
finding a solution that would permit them to operate their businesses
more safely and more effectively. Therefore, they are better positioned
to take this additional risk.
It has long been recognized that states occupy a unique position in
our federal system of government. Before Gonzales, the U.S. Supreme
Court previously held that the right to assisted suicide was not a fundamental liberty.253 However, the Court expressly stated that the debate
over whether states should permit assisted-suicide should continue. 254
This decision comports with the concept that states are "laboratories of
democracy," a phrase coined by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman.2 As laboratories of democracy, "states are closer to the people and thus more likely to be responsive to public needs and concers."256 Colorado and others have been labeled laboratories in the recreational marijuana experiment. 257 Moreover, President Obama agrees
that the state recreational marijuana "experiment[s]" should "go forward"
in an interview with The New Yorker shortly before sales began in Colorado. 258 If the government is permitting states to conduct this experiment, the states should be allowed to find solutions to the problems they
encounter along the way if the federal government refuses to act. Without this flexibility, the experiment may be doomed from the beginning.

253. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) ("[O]ur decisions lead us to
conclude that the asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.").
254. Id. at 735 ("Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this
debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society").
255. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.").
256. Erwin Chemerinsky, Does FederalismAdvance Liberty?, 49 WAYNE L. REv.

911,927 (2001).
257. See Alex Leary, Colorado's MarijuanaExperiment, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28,
2014, http://hrld.us/lw5RT8y; see also Matt Femer, Hillary Clinton Leaves Door Open
on Marijuana legalization, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2014, 8:11 PM),
http://huff.to/llQIqKN (reporting former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, "On
recreational, states are the laboratories of democracy"); Dylan Stableford, Bill Clinton:
States Should Experiment With Marijuana Legalization, YAHOO NEWS (June 19, 2014,
1:11 PM), http://yhoo.it/TJlMsI (reporting that former President Bill Clinton stated "I
think we should leave it to the states. If the state wants to try it, they can"); Philip A.
Wallach, Washington's MarijuanaLegalization Grows Knowledge, Not Just Pot, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 25, 2014), http://brook.gs/llu785X ("Washington's government is tak-

ing its role as laboratory of democracy very seriously...").
258. David Remnick, Going The Distance, NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://nyr.kr/lnPcqTZ (reporting that when President Obama was asked about Colorado
and Washington's legalization of marijuana, he replied "it's important for it to go forward.").
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Due to federal laws governing marijuana and financial services,
Colorado's legal marijuana businesses are operating on a cash-only basis.
Largely unable to access banking services, marijuana businesses have
become targets for crime. Businesses must pay their employees, vendors, and taxes in cash, a situation ideal for tax fraud and evasion. Congress has failed to address this issue, and the executive branch has gone
only so far as issuing administrative guidance intended to spark financial
relationships between banks and marijuana businesses while providing
no real protections for either party.
While this Comment recognizes that Colorado's cannabis cooperatives unlikely are the most ideal answer to the marijuana industry's financial services problem, the cooperatives provide a potentially workable solution for the short term until the federal government provides a
permanent alternative. Colorado should employ its traditional police
powers, similar to Oregon's assertion of its police powers in enacting the
ODWDA, to solve this problem that is of great concern to its citizens.
State-legal marijuana businesses operating on a cash-only basis is not a
viable option for Colorado.

